Abstract
Introduction
Modern commodity operating systems cannot assume that disk drives either work perfectly or fail perfectly. Even modern hard disks are far from being perfect. They do not operate in "fail-stop" fashion: they exhibit complex partial failures, in which a set of blocks may be inaccessible [11, 20] or the data stored in some blocks may be silently corrupted [5, 15] . The complex causes of these errors are still under study [28] . Worse, such errors are not expected to diminish as disk technology improves. Increase in disk drive complexity [4] , and increased use of low-cost, unreliable ATA disks mean that the incidence of such errors could increase. Therefore, commodity operating systems should be equipped to deal with partial disk failures. While highend systems have typically employed mechanisms to deal with disk faults by using techniques like checksumming [5] and disk scrubbing [27] , commodity operating systems do not have explicitly specified failure handling mechanisms and policies.
Recent work [26] has explored the failure handling policies of commodity file systems. In this paper, we explore the failure handling capabilities of virtual memory systems, an integral part of any modern operating system, and like file systems, a significant user of disk storage.
We use type and context aware fault injection techniques to elicit the failure handling policies of the virtual memory systems of two operating systems, Linux 2.6.13 and FreeBSD 6.0. We also perform a preliminary study of the Windows XP virtual memory system. We characterize the policies of these systems based on the Internal RObustness (IRON) taxonomy proposed in earlier work [26] .
We find that these virtual memory systems are not wellequipped to deal with partial failures. Like the file systems studied earlier, the virtual memory systems use policies that are illogically inconsistent and their failure handling routines have bugs. In most cases, the failure handling policy is simplistic, and in some cases, even absent. This disregard for partial disk failures leads to many problems, ranging for loss of physical memory abstraction, to data corruption, and even to system security violations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on partial disk failures, virtual memory systems and the IRON taxonomy. Section 3 describes our fault injection and analysis methodology. Section 4 presents experimental results and analyzes the failure handling approaches of the systems. Section 5 discusses related work and Section 6 concludes.
Background
This section first discusses partial failures in commodity hard disks, then provides background on virtual memory systems, and finally presents the taxonomy of failure handling policies used in the paper to characterize failure handling in virtual memory systems.
Partial disk failures
This section presents different causes of partial failures in the disk subsystem and discusses a suitable failure model for disks. Almost all layers of the storage stack contribute to the partial failures exhibited by the disk subsystem. The causes range from classic problems such as media errors due to "bit rot" or head crashes, to errors in bus controllers [34] , and to more recent problems arising from buggy firmware code [31] . Additionally, it has been shown that device drivers are likely to contain more bugs than the rest of the operating system [12, 10, 29] . The entire range of sources of disk failures has been documented in a recent paper [26] , which also proposes a failure model for disks called the Fail-Partial Failure Model. We adopt this model for injecting disk errors in this study. Our study makes use of the following aspects of the fail-partial failure model:
• Types of errors: Partial disk failures can cause (a) I/O errors when blocks are read or written; that is, an error code is returned by the disk, or (b) block corruption, wherein the contents of a disk block read by the operating system is altered and no error code is returned by the disk.
• Transience of errors: Disk failures can be permanent ("sticky") or temporary ("transient"). In the case of a transient failure, there are no errors if the same I/O operation is performed again.
The failure model does not incorporate specific frequencies for the different error types since data on the frequency of partial disk failures is scarce. Drive manufacturers are loathe to provide such information [3, 30] . Schwarz et al. estimate that partial disk errors may occur five times more often than absolute disk failures [27] . More recent experiments by Gray and Ingen [14] with SATA disk drives uncovered 30 uncorrectable read errors from the point of view of the operating system in a 6-month experiment period.
Given that partial disk failures occur and should be dealt with, the question arises as to what component should deal with the failures. For instance, one may argue that disk mirroring can be used to deal with such errors. But, our belief is that operating system components cannot rely on mirrored disks to provide a dependable computing environment. Moreover, possible component-specific policies and optimizations cannot be employed when simple mirroring is used. Therefore, each operating system component that uses disks should include its own failure handling policy.
Virtual memory systems
A virtual memory system uses disk storage to provide applications with an address space larger than available physical memory. This helps the system execute multiple processes with large address spaces simultaneously. The disk area used by the virtual memory system is called swap space. The virtual memory system uses swap space to store memory pages that are not expected to be of immediate use. Typically, systems tend to remove pages that have not been accessed recently or that are not accessed frequently from memory and store them on disk (called page-out). When a page stored on disk is accessed again, it is brought back into physical memory (called page-in). The page-out/pagein process is transparent to applications (except for performance effects). Thus, the virtual memory system is responsible for handling disk errors and maintaining the illusion that the page is actually in physical memory.
Virtual memory systems make use of file systems in two situations. First, instead of directly using on-disk space, swap space can also be maintained as a file in a file system. Second, virtual memory systems allow applications to memory-map file data (e.g. using the mmap system call). When a file (or a portion of a file) is memory mapped, applications can operate on file data as if they were memory locations. User code pages are also memory-mapped from the executable file when a program is executed. In situations involving a file system, the virtual memory system depends on the file system to recover from or propagate disk errors.
The following subsections outline the features of two virtual memory systems, Linux 2.6.13 and FreeBSD 6.0, whose failure handling policies have been studied in this paper. The features of the Windows XP virtual memory system will be discussed with its evaluation in Section 4.1.4.
Linux 2.6.13
The Linux 2.6.13 virtual memory system has largely been derived from the previous Linux versions. It performs swapping only for user-mode pages [7] . User-mode pages are the data, stack, and code pages that form the user process. In order to keep the virtual memory system simple, pages that belong to the kernel are not paged out. This simplification is not highly restrictive as kernel pages occupy only a small portion of main memory. The page replacement algorithm used is similar to the "2Q" algorithm [18] . When paged-out pages are accessed, space is created for the pages and they are read from disk. The system also issues reads in advance (i.e., read-ahead) based on application accesses to improve performance. The swap area can either be a separate disk partition or a file in a file system. It contains a swap header that has information about the swap area like number of blocks, a list of faulty blocks and so on. [26] . The level R Record has been added in this paper.
FreeBSD 6.0
FreeBSD [1] is an open source operating system derived from BSD UNIX. The design of the virtual memory system in FreeBSD is originally based on the Mach 2.0 virtual memory system, with considerable updates over the years. The FreeBSD 6.0 virtual memory system allocates pages when requested from a free list of pages and it maintains sufficient free pages by paging out less frequently used (inactive) pages [23] . The FreeBSD virtual memory system also provides for paging out entire processes. This implies that in addition to user-mode pages, the kernel thread stacks of processes can be paged out and page tables can be freed when the system is under extreme memory pressure [23] . Unlike Linux, the FreeBSD virtual memory system does not perform extra read-ahead; that is, it does not issue separate block read commands, although it tries to read as many as 8 blocks as part of one read command for a block that is needed. Like in Linux, the FreeBSD swap area can either be a disk partition or a file. The FreeBSD swap area does not have any data structures like the Linux swap header.
Failure Handling Policy Taxonomy
In this paper, we extend the IRON taxonomy proposed in an earlier paper [26] . The taxonomy was originally designed to describe the failure handling policies of file systems, but we find that it is applicable to virtual memory systems as well. The IRON taxonomy consists of two axis: Detection and Recovery. Table 1 and Table 2 describe the different levels of Detection and Recovery respectively. In addition to the levels proposed previously, we include a new recovery level: R Record . At this level, the system records that the I/O operation did not succeed. This level of recovery prevents the system from performing any action that assumes successful completion of the I/O operation. For example, when a write error is detected and the system recovers using R Record , it does not free the "dirty" memory page assuming that it has been successfully written out to disk, thus avoiding data loss.
We also extend the IRON taxonomy by adding a third axis: Prevention. The Prevention axis encompasses techniques used to avoid loss due to partial disk failures. Table 3 describes different levels of Prevention:
• Zero: The system may not use any special prevention techniques. In this case, the system assumes either that the disk works or that errors can be dealt with when they occur.
• Remember: A basic prevention strategy that can be used is to remember that a specific block is "bad" once the system has had at least one bad experience in using the block. This strategy could prevent future data loss.
• Reboot: A phenomenon that has been observed for a long time is that systems are either less likely to fail or faults are cured if the systems are rebooted or reinitialized [9] (since the systems can be rid of effects of transient bugs accumulated over time). This fact can be used as a failure prevention strategy by periodically rebooting subsystems [17] . The rebooting strategy for virtual memory systems could range from disabling and then enabling a swap area periodically to even re-initializing the drivers/disk controllers.
• LoadBalance: This prevention technique attempts to reduce the wear on the data blocks by balancing the load on Balances the read/write load on disk blocks Attempts to reduce the effects of "wear" on blocks PScan
Performs read or write checks with bogus data Detects possibly "sticky" block errors them. An example of this technique is the use of wearleveling in file systems for flash drives (like JFFS2 [2] ).
• Scan: The final prevention technique is scanning the disk for bad blocks by performing accesses, perhaps with bogus data. This technique is used in RAID systems to weed out potential bad blocks -the process is called "disk scrubbing" [20, 27] . While this technique was classified as an eager Detection technique earlier [26] , we feel that it can be employed as a prevention technique. Virtual memory systems can scan the swap area periodically during disk idle time or by using freeblock scheduling [21] and avoid using disk blocks found to be "bad" in the scan.
Methodology
In this section, we describe our fault injection and analysis methodology. Our fault injection framework consists of two components, the Benchmark and the Injector. The Benchmark layer sets the system up for exposure to disk faults. The layer consists of three types of user processes: a coordinator for managing the benchmarking and fault injection, victims that allocate a large memory region, sleep for a while and then read the memory region, and aggressors that allocate large memory regions to force out the victims' pages to the swap area or the file system. Disk errors are injected either when the victims' pages are paged out to disk or when they are read back by the victims.
The error injection is performed by the Injector layer, which interposes between the virtual memory system and the hard disk. Specifically, the Injector has been built as a pseudo-device driver for Linux 2.6.13, as a geom layer [23] for FreeBSD 6.0, and as an upper filter driver for Windows XP. The Injector is located above the device drivers because: (a) drivers are a significant source of errors [29] and the virtual memory system should be equipped to handle errors, and (b) the policies of the virtual memory system can be observed in isolation using this method.
The different types of errors injected by the Injector are read errors, write errors, and corruption errors. In the case of read and write errors, an error code is returned to the virtual memory system. We also ensure that valid data is not placed in memory if the read is failed with an error code. This technique is needed because the virtual memory system may ignore an error code returned; in such a case, if valid data is placed in the respective memory page, the system may seem to work just fine. For corruption errors, the block contents are altered; we zero out the block in our experiments and in case the corruption is detected, we perform a more detailed analysis, corrupting each field of the data structure with field-specific values in separate experiments.
We perform type and context aware fault injection by injecting disk errors for specific disk blocks at specific times. An example of a data type is a user-level private data segment (user data). Therefore, an error injected for a disk block that holds a private user data page is type-aware. A context is a basic function performed by the virtual memory system or an interface offered by the virtual memory system to applications. An example of a context is the swapoff system call. Therefore, an error injected for a disk block when swapoff is in progress is context-aware. Table 4 presents various data types for which errors are injected and indicates which virtual memory systems use them, and Table 5 presents different contexts when error injection can be performed. The different types and contexts that can be explored are dependent on the particular system under study.
In order to perform type-aware error injection, the Injector should be able to detect the type of blocks being read or written. This detection is accomplished in a variety of ways. The Benchmark layer communicates type information regarding data pages to the Injector. For example, the Benchmark allocates data pages and initializes those pages to contain specific values and conveys the values to the Injector. Thus, in such cases, the Injector uses block contents to determine the block type. Another method employed to determine the type is to use the location of the block. For example, the Linux swap header is always located at block 0.
The failure handling policy of the system is identified by a manual observation of the results of error injection. Specifically, we use the following sources of information:
• The Injector: The Injector logs all I/O operations in detail, enabling us to determine some failure handling policies; for instance, whether the virtual memory system is performing retries (read or write is repeated with the same disk block number) or remapping (disk write is repeated for a different disk block, but with the same memory page).
• The Benchmark: The Benchmark records all return values and signals received. This helps in determining whether an error is propagated. The Benchmark also checks (and reports) the validity of data read back. This helps in checking whether there is data corruption.
• System messages: The operating system may emit error messages to the system message log. We use these techniques to determine the failure handling policies adopted by virtual memory systems for different combinations of data type, context and error type. These techniques are primarily used to determine Detection and Recovery policies. We discuss experiments to determine Prevention policies in Section 4.1.3.
Analysis
In this section, we first present the results of our experiments on three virtual memory systems, then analyze the failure handling approach of the systems, and finally discuss our experience with the fault injection techniques used.
Experimental Results
We have performed a detailed analysis of the Linux 2.6.13 and FreeBSD 6.0 virtual memory systems, and a preliminary analysis of the Windows XP virtual memory system. We first focus on Detection and Recovery techniques of Linux and FreeBSD, then discuss Prevention techniques of those systems, and finally evaluate Windows XP.
We present about 30 different scenarios (combinations of data type, context and error type) for Linux and FreeBSD.
All experiments involving swap space are performed using a separate disk partition as swap space (except for Windows XP), while experiments involving memory-mapped files or user code pages use the ext3 file system [33] in Linux 2.6.13 and the Unix File System (UFS2) [23] in FreeBSD 6.0. The observed failure handling policy for experiments involving a file system is a combination of the policies of the virtual memory system and the file system.
Linux 2.6.13
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of fault injection on the Linux 2.6.13 virtual memory system. Detection: We find that most read errors are detected using D ErrorCode , which is checking of return codes. The exceptions occur during swapoff (when the virtual memory system pages valid blocks into memory); the error is not detected (D Zero ) and the application to which the data belongs is given junk data on a future memory access. This could lead to application crashes or data corruption.
None of the write errors are detected (D Zero ). A read of the page after an ignored write error causes the virtual memory system to page-in the disk block with its previous contents. Missing these errors can lead to application crashes or application data corruption (because of bad data) or even system security problems since the application could possibly read data that belongs to another process. 
This table presents the Linux 2.6.13 detection techniques for read, write and corruption errors for combinations of data type (rows) and context (columns). Comments, if any, are provided below the tables.
Almost all corruption errors are not detected and the corrupted data is returned to the application. One exception is the use of D Sanity for the swap header during swapon. The sanity checks are for (a) the correct swap space signature (b) the correct version number, and (c) the number of bad blocks being less than the maximum allowable. Recovery: For cases where the disk error is detected, Linux uses basic recovery mechanisms. When there is a read error for an application-accessed page, the SIGBUS signal is used to inform the application of an error (R P ropagate ). In the case of a shared memory page, all processes that touch the page after the read error occurs receive the SIGBUS signal -in other words, the virtual memory system does not retry the read when each process accesses the page. Another use of R P ropagate is when the swap header is corrupted, in which case an error is returned for the swapon call.
In the experiments with memory-mapped file data and user code, a retry is observed (R Retry ) for the specific disk block that the system actually needs; even if the original operation involved many disk blocks, the retry is performed for only one block. This retry may have been initiated by the file system and not the virtual memory system. When a read to the swap header fails during swapon, a retry is performed (R Retry ), but perhaps due to implementation bugs, the results of the retry are not actually used. Also, swapon returns success during read errors even though the call fails swapon swapoff pagetouch readahead madvise pageout umount (2) One separate retry for every block needed in the original request (3) Retry is not actually used (4) Operation fails but success is returned (error is not propagated) (5) This operation is remembered when page is actually touched (6) Error propagates to all processes that touch the page after the read error occurs internally (i.e. it does not propagate the error). R Record is used to handle read errors for readahead and madvise. By using R Record , the system records the failure of the read for future reference. In both readahead and madvise, the data is not required immediately -read-ahead is only an optimization by the virtual memory system and madvise is only a hint that the block will likely be accessed. In the readahead case, the error is propagated when the page is actually touched and for madvise, a retry is performed when the page is touchedboth actions use the fact that the first read was unsuccessful. Tables 8 and 9 present the results of fault injection on the FreeBSD 6.0 virtual memory system. Detection: D ErrorCode is used in every single case for detecting both read and write errors -the FreeBSD 6.0 virtual memory system always checks the error code returned. FreeBSD does not detect block corruption (D Zero ). While this leads to application crash or data corruption in most cases, it leads to a kernel crash when corruption of kernel 
FreeBSD 6.0
user data - E E ---- user stack - E E ---- shared - E E ---- mmapped -- E ---- user code -- E ---- Read Errors kernel stack - E -- E -- user data ----- E - user stack ----- E - shared ----- E - mmapped ----- E E user code ------- Write Errors kernel stack ----- E - user data - Z Z ---- user stack - Z Z ---- shared - Z Z ---- mmapped -- Z ---- user code -- Z ---- Corruption kernel stack - Z -- Z -- Symbols Z Zero E Errorcode -Experiment not applicable
This table presents the FreeBSD 6.0 detection techniques for read, write and corruption errors for combinations of data type (rows) and context (columns). FreeBSD does not read any block during swapon and does not read pages in for madvise (-in the table).
thread stack blocks is not detected; in this case serious errors like system becoming unbootable are also possible. Recovery: Various recovery mechanisms are used in FreeBSD 6.0 to deal with detected errors. R Retry is used when memory-mapped data is written during a file system unmount. In fact, the system retries as many as 6 times for each umount call. We believe that these retries are performed by the file system and not the virtual memory system (we still document the behavior here since it is the behavior observed by an application using memory-mapped file data, a feature supported by the virtual memory system). Read errors during page accesses cause the virtual memory system to deliver a SIGSEGV (segmentation fault) to the application, an instance of R P ropagate . Experiments showed that in the case of shared memory, unlike in Linux, processes sharing the memory region operate independently; that is, even if the error has been propagated to one of the processes that accessed the page, the disk access is retried when a second process accesses the page. R P ropagate is also used when all write retries are failed during umount; an I/O error is returned to the application.
R Stop is used for read errors during swapoff and for read errors during a page-in of the kernel thread stack. In both cases, the result is a kernel panic, a conservative action. During pageout, the virtual memory system attempts to free memory pages by writing them to swap swapon swapoff pagetouch madvise complete pageout umount
Kernel crashes when the stack is used (2) SIGSEGV signal (3) kernel panic (4) Memory page is not freed; alternate victim chosen for page-out (5) Upto six retries of the write operation (for all blocks) (6) I/O error returned space. If write errors occur during this page-out process, the FreeBSD virtual memory system recovers using R Record . In this case, the virtual memory system remembers that the write operation has not been performed successfully, so that the memory page is not freed. Since the virtual memory system is not able to successfully free the memory page, it proceeds to select an alternate victim for page-out.
Prevention Techniques
Determining Prevention policies is more difficult than determining Detection and Recovery policies since the Prevention policy may not be triggered by a particular disk fault. Therefore, our methodology for uncovering the Prevention policy is to use a specific test for each Prevention technique. P Remember is the only technique triggered by faults. We test for P Remember by injecting a "sticky" error repeatedly for the same disk block and checking whether the virtual memory system stops using the disk block. The workload performs 10 iterations of a page-out/page-in of victim pages. For both Linux 2.6.13 and FreeBSD 6.0 we find that the "bad" disk block is used repeatedly, in spite of returning an error each time. The same results are obtained for both read and write errors. This indicates that Linux and FreeBSD likely do not keep track of bad blocks (i.e. P Remember is not used).
We test for P LoadBalance by causing the virtual memory system to page-out many pages numerous times and checking whether all blocks in the swap area are used fairly evenly. This workload performs 10 iterations of a pageout/page-in of victim pages. In both Linux and FreeBSD, the same disk blocks are reused repeatedly, even though many other blocks in the swap area have not been written to even once. This indicates that the systems likely do not perform wear-leveling (i.e. P LoadBalance is not used).
Finally, to detect P Reboot and P Scan we simply observe whether these activities occur over an interval of using the virtual memory system. Given that we did not observe any instance of P Reboot or P Scan during any of our experiments, we infer that it is likely that neither Linux nor FreeBSD use these techniques. In summary, our experiments indicate that neither Linux 2.6.13 nor FreeBSD 6.0 appear to use Prevention techniques.
Windows XP
This section first outlines particular features of the Windows XP virtual memory system, then discusses its failure handling policies. Windows XP uses a file in an NTFS partition to store memory pages that get paged-out. Therefore, the failure handling policy we extract is a combination of policies of NTFS and the virtual memory system. Windows XP allows for paging out of both user and kernel memory. We inject faults only for user data pages. Read and corruption errors are injected during pagetouch and write errors are injected during pageout. We use the error code STATUS DEVICE DATA ERROR for read and write errors. Detection: Windows XP uses the error code returned by the disk to detect both read and write errors (D ErrorCode ). Corruption errors are not detected (D Zero ). Recovery: Recovery from read errors is by terminating the user application, reporting the error InPageError (R P ropagate ). Recovery from write errors is more involved. It primarily uses R Record : the memory pages for which the error occurs are written elsewhere when they are selected for paging out again. As for the disk block with the error, it is first read back. If this read succeeds, a half-block write is performed. If the read fails, a half-block read is performed. Irrespective of the success or failure of the halfblock operations, the block is used for future writes, using R Record to deal with any errors to these writes. We have so far not been able to identify the purpose of the half-block operations. Also, after a transient write error, although the disk blocks are subsequently successfully written, they are not read back even when the application accesses the data, thereby leading to the application receiving junk data. This indicates a possible bug in handling write errors. Further investigation is required to ascertain this behavior. Prevention: Error injection experiments demonstrated that a given disk block is not re-used after about 6 errors for the block (P Remember ). The block is added to a bad cluster file and is never used again unless the disk is re-formatted.
Failure Handling Approaches
In this section, we discuss the approaches that current virtual memory systems adopt to handle disk failures, contrasting the techniques used and identifying the deficiencies of the systems. We also compare the approach of virtual memory systems to that of file systems (explored in [26] ). We start by summarizing the different approaches of the virtual memory systems:
• Linux: Linux fails to detect many disk errors (even ones where error codes are returned) and follows simple recovery schemes to deal with detected errors. With respect to corruption, only swap header corruption is detected.
• FreeBSD: FreeBSD correctly detects all disk errors with error codes, but ignores corruption errors. It uses simple recovery schemes to deal with errors, although it is more conservative than Linux for some cases -the kernel calls panic to stop the entire system when a read fails during swapoff, even if the read affects only a single application.
• Windows XP: Windows XP detects disk errors with error codes but ignores corruption errors. It uses simple recovery schemes. It is the only system for which we observed a prevention technique (P Remember ).
In general, the systems suffer from the following deficiencies:
• Simple recovery techniques. The virtual memory systems studied use only simple recovery techniques to deal with disk errors. There is no attempt to use techniques like redundancy to completely recover from the disk errors.
• Ignoring data corruption. Of all our data corruption experiments, only one case (Linux swap header) is detected. Virtual memory systems assume that disks store data reliably, which may not be true for commodity hardware.
• Under-developed mechanisms. A prime example of an under-developed mechanism is remembering bad blocks. The Linux swap header has a provision to store a list of bad blocks. This list can be used effectively to prevent data loss (P Remember ). However, the list is initialized during mkswap and not updated afterward when new errors occur (on the other hand, Windows XP actively uses and updates a bad cluster file to avoid using error-prone blocks).
• Memory abstraction mismatch. Applications expect all their pages to behave as if they are always in memory. The virtual memory system should maintain this memory abstraction even when there are disk errors. An important part of maintaining the abstraction is error reporting. If an error cannot be handled by the system, it should be propagated in a manner that fits the memory abstraction. For example, Linux uses the SIGBUS signal to propagate page read errors (by definition, hardware failures can cause SIGBUS to be generated). However, FreeBSD uses the SIGSEGV signal (which almost always is intended to indicate a programming error) to propagate read errors, which is not appropriate.
• Very few retries. There were very few instances of retrying an operation when an error occurs. Retrying can solve the problem in the case of a transient error and systems would benefit greatly by employing retries [14] .
• Illogical inconsistency. The error recovery techniques employed are inconsistent for cases which are not very different. For example, in FreeBSD, a read error for a user data page may result in a propagate in one case (pagetouch), while it results in kernel panic in another (swapoff).
• Buggy implementation. It is observed in Linux that failure handling code is buggy. For example, the result of a retry is ignored, making it useless. We suspect that failure handling code is rarely tested and is thus likely to have bugs, as seen elsewhere [24] .
• Security issues. A system that is fairly secure during normal operation could become insecure when there is a partial failure. In Linux, when data is read back after a failed write, the disk block's previous contents are returned to the application, possibly delivering data that the application is not authorized to read. Such failures need to be dealt with given that there is an increasing awareness towards exploiting even transient hardware errors to attack systems [13] .
• Kernel exposure. Systems should take special care when kernel-mode data is stored on disk. In FreeBSD, corruption of the kernel thread stack is not detected. This may result in undesirable crashes or severe data corruption.
When the policies of virtual memory systems are compared to that of file systems, we observe the following:
• Both kinds of systems share problems like illogical inconsistency and implementation bugs in failure handling code. This points to a general disregard for partial disk errors, thus exposing commodity computer systems to data loss, data corruption and inexplicable crashes.
• The Linux virtual memory system, like some file systems [26] , misses a large number of write errors.
• Both virtual memory systems and file systems do not deal with corruption errors in an elegant manner. We see that file systems perform some sanity checking to deal with corruption to file system data structures, but there is no protection for user data (which is the only data handled by virtual memory systems for the most part).
• FreeBSD and Windows XP leverage an important difference between file systems and virtual memory systems in that writes are required to succeed in file systems, while virtual memory systems have alternatives like choosing an other page as victim and writing it elsewhere on disk.
Experience
Experimenting with multiple systems not only helps us compare these systems, but also provides an insight into the advantages and limitations of our methodology. Our experience is that the techniques are simple to use and can be applied to many different systems. While the tool has to be rewritten for each environment, we find that the task is not onerous. We observed one particular limitation: there is no easy way to identify the source of disk accesses and the accesses may be attributed to error recovery while it may be unrelated. An example of this problem occurs when a read error is injected for a user data page in FreeBSD or Windows XP. We observe what seems to be a "retry" of the read. Even if this "retry" succeeds, the application is terminated, indicating a possible bug in the retry code. Only closer examination revealed that the second read is performed to create a core dump and not to recover from the error. It would be interesting to explore techniques to identify the exact source of disk accesses in future work.
Related Work
Many techniques have been developed over the years to inject faults in various systems [6, 19, 22, 32] . These and other techniques have been used in fault injection studies that explore operating system behavior under errors [16, 22] . However, these studies do not explore partial disk failures in detail, or bring out techniques and policies used by the operating system to deal with such failures.
Our study is similar in spirit to Brown and Patterson's study of failure policies of different software RAID systems [8] . While software RAIDs are type and context agnostic, the behavior of a virtual memory system differs considerably for different data types and contexts and therefore requires more complex fault injection and analysis.
This study is most related to our earlier studies on how file systems handle partial disk failures [25, 26] . Along with file systems, the virtual memory system is one of the most important operating system components that uses disks significantly. While applications are aware that a disk is used to store files, the use of disks by the virtual memory system is completely transparent to applications, requiring the virtual memory system to be robust to disk failures.
Conclusions
Commodity hardware is becoming increasingly unreliable due to escalating complexity and cost pressures. Operating systems can no longer assume that hardware components, especially hard disks, work or fail as a whole. The virtual memory system is an important subsystem in every modern operating system. Therefore, virtual memory systems should be designed to deal with partial disk failures. From our fault injection experiments, we find that current virtual memory systems do not employ consistent failure policies that provide complete recovery from partial failures. Improving the failure-awareness of these systems would enable them to truly virtualize memory, providing applications with a robust memory abstraction.
